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In this paper we provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an
asymmetric-information model of layoffs in which the current employer is
better informed about its workers' abilities than prospective employers
are. The key feature of the model is that when firms have discretion with
respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of
low ability. Since no such negative inference should be attached o
workers displaced in a plant closing, our model predicts that the post-
displacement wages of otherwise observationally equivalent workers will be
higher for those displaced by plant closings than for those displaced by
layoffs. An extension of our model predicts that the average post-
displacement unemployment spell of otherwise observationally equivalent
workers will be shorter for those displaced by plant closings than for
those displaced by layoffs.
In our empirical work, we use data from the Displaced Workers
Supplements in the January 1984 and 1986 Current Population Surveys. We
find that the evidence (with respect to both re-employment wages and post-
displacement unemployment duration) is consistent with the idea that laid-
off workers are viewed less favorably by the market than are those losing
jobs in plant closings. Our findings are much stronger for workers laid-
off from jobs where employers have discretion over whom to lay off.
Robert Gibbons Lawrence F. Katz
Department of Economics Department of Economics
MIT Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02139 Cambridge, MA 021381. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1976) and Spence (1973), labor
economists have understood that asymmetric information about workers'
productive abilities can affect labor-market outcomes. A number of recent
theoretical papers have elaborated on this theme, and also have shifted
attention from a worker's private information (vis avisprospective
employers) about his or her productive ability to an employer's private
information (vis avisthe market) about an employee's ability. Waldman
(1984), Milgrom and Oster (1987), and Ricart i Costa (1988), for instance,
describe inefficient job assignments that result when an employer has
private information concerning employees' abilities, and Creenwald (1986),
Lazear (1986), and Riordan and Staiger (1987) describe analogous
consequences for wages and mobility in the presence of such asymmetric
information.
It seems plausible that a worker's current employer may be better
informed about the worker's ability than prospective employers are, but the
predictions generated by the existing theoretical models based on this
assumption mainly concern variables that are not included in standard micro
data sets (such as promotions within the firm or wage offers from
prospective employers). As a result, there have been (to our knowledge) no
empirical tests of these predictions. It therefore seems prudent to
develop an asymmetric-information model that generates new testable
predictions and to check that these predictions are not wildly at odds with
the facts.
In this paper we provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an
asymmetric-information model of layoffs in which the current employer is
better informed about its workers' abilities than prospective employers2
are. Our theoretical model offers new answers to such time-honored
questions as why layoffs occur and how firms determine which workers to lay
off,1 and our empirical work offers the first quantitative evidence
consistent with the burgeoning collection of asymmetric-information models
described above.
The main idea behind the paper is simple: a firm's desire to retain a
worker signals to the market that the worker is of high ability, so the
market bids up the wage of retained workers; as a result, the firm finds it
unprofitable to retain low-ability workers and hence lays themoff.2 The
market then infers that laid-off workers are of low ability, and so offers
them low wages in their next jobs. Workers displaced by plant closings, in
contrast, suffer from no such adverse inference and so receive (relatively)
higher re-employment wages from the market. Our model thus predicts that
the post-displacement wages of (otherwise observationally equivalent)
workers will differ according to the cause of displacement.
In our empirical work, we use data from the Displaced Workers
Supplements in the January 1984 and 1986 Current Population Surveys. We
find that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that (permanently)
laid-off workers are viewed less favorably by the market than are those
losing jobs in plant closings: For our sample (of males) as a whole,
workers displaced by a layoff suffer a 4 percent greater wage loss than do
1Our answers to these questions are of course complementary to the
conventional wisdom that layoffs are caused by shocks and determined by
seniority.
2One might ask why low-ability workers cannot be retained at a low
wage. As will become clear below, the answer is that if the firm could
retain low-ability workers at a low wage then it would also retain high-
ability workers at this low wage, thereby destroying the market's
willingness to allow any workers to be retained at the low wage.3
workers displaced by a plant closing. Furthermore, among white-collar
workers, the extra wage loss from a layoff is 5.5 percent, and for white-
collar workers with at least two years of pre-displacement job tenure it is
8.7 percent. As we explain below, these stronger effects for the white-
collar and the high-tenure, white-collar sub-samples are also implied by
our model, because the information content of a layoff is greater where
employers have both better information about workers' abilities and the
opportunity to act on this information.
In addition to predicting that post-displacement wages should differ
by cause of displacement, the lemons model we develop also predicts that
there should be no post-displacement unemployment. It is simple to extend
the model, however, so that the spirit of the prediction about wages
carries over to a prediction about unemployment durations: the average
post-displacement unemployment duration should be longer for workers
displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings. We find
that the evidence also is consistent with this prediction: workers laid-off
(and not recalled) have approximately 25 percent longer post-displacement
unemployment spells than do those displaced in plant closings. As we
describe below, only part of this estimate should be attributed to a lemons
effect, but we also report several further pieces of evidence that together
suggest an important role for ourlemonsmodel in accounting for the
observed variation in post-displacement unemployment duration by cause of
displacement and by occupation.
In sum, we find that the evidence with respect to both re-employment
wages and post-displacement unemployment duration is consistent with the
idea that laid-off workers are viewed less favorably by the market than are4
those losing jobs in plant closings. In interpreting these empirical
results, it is worth noting that they do not control for a potentially
important effect in the opposite direction: if a plant is large compared to
its local labor market, then the increase in the local unemployment rate
following a plant closing seems likely both to depress the re-employment
wages and to extend the typical unemployment duration of displacedworkers.
We view our empirical results as satisfying a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for confidence in models based on asymmetric
information about workers' abilities: had our estimates rejected our model,
it would have cast serious doubt on the entire family of models based on
the information asymmetry we analyze. Alternatively, our empirical results
can be interpreted as support for various symmetric-information models, as
we discuss in detail below.
The body of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical results on wages
and unemployment duration, respectively. Section 5 summarizes and
interprets our findings.
2. The Theoretical Model
In the signaling equilibrium described below, a firm lays off its
least productive workers. Prospective employers then infer that these
workers are of low productivity and so offer them a low wage. Because no
such inference occurs after a plant closing, the re-employment wage of
workers who lose their jobs because of a plant closing is higher than that
of workers who lose their jobs because of a layoff. Our model of layoffs5
is closely related to Waldman's (1984) model of job assignment: in
Waldman's model, the firm assigns low-ability workers to a menial job
(i.e., a job for which output is independent of ability); here, the firm
lays off these workers.
The model has two periods. The major elements of the model are (1)
the production technology, (2) the information structure, (3) the
commitment and contracting possibilities, and (4) the timing of events
between periods one and two. We discuss each of these elements in turn.
(1) The vroduction technology: The first-period output of a worker of
(time-invariant) productive abilityis y1(r) —r,.The second-period
output of a worker of ability iisy2(v) —(1+s)t(where s>O) if the worker
remains with the first-period employer, but is y2(i7) —if the worker
changes employers. The parameter s therefore represents the acquisition of
firm-specific human capital.3
(2) The information structure: At the beginning of the first period,
information is symmetric: all firms and all workers share the belief that
workers' productive abilities are independently and identically distributed
according to the (atomless) distribution F(tj) on (O,'i), with (strictly
positive) density f(,7).4 At the end of the first period, the worker's
current employer observes the worker's first-period output and so perfectly
infers the worker's ability. Prospective employers, however, do not
observe output and so do not (yet) update their beliefs about the worker's
3All of our qualitative conclusions alsoemerge from the alternative
model in which y2(i) —v+s,provided s is not extremely large.The
firm-specific human capital (s) in this alternative model can also be
interpreted as a mobility cost.
4Note that we assume that the lowest possible productive ability is
zero. This avoids unenlightening complications in what follows.6
ability. Finally, to keep things simple, we make assumptions below (on the
kinds of wage and employment contracts that are feasible) to guarantee that
it is immaterial whether or not the worker observes first-period output.
In the interest of clarity, we impose a (rather weak) regularity
condition on the distribution of productive ability: f(r) must be log-
concave (i.e., ln f(i) must be concave in ),whichimplies that
d(E(I,x)}/dx ￿1for every x.5 Many familiar distributions---including
the uniform, Normal, exponential, and beta distributions---satisfy this
condition. Furthermore, the truncation of a log-concave distribution is
log-concave.
(3) Contracting Possibilities: We assume that neither contingent nor
long-term contracts are possible. Thus, for example, the first-period wage
cannot be contingent on the worker's first-period output. Similarly, the
firmcannotcommit to paying a second-period wage that is contingent on
first-period output (but in equilibrium, once the second period arrives,
the firm does choose to pay a wage that depends on ability, as described
below). In effect, each period's wages are paid in advance: w1 is paid at
the beginning of the first period and w2 is both determined and paid at the
beginning of the second.
The assumption that contracts contingent on output cannot be enforced
fits naturally with our assumption that output is not observable by
5See Caplin and Nalebuff (1989) and Heckman and Honore (1987) for
proofs of this result. We assume log-concavity for two reasons: First, it
greatly simplifies the proof of our existence and uniqueness results in
Proposition 1 (but it is worth noting that much weaker assumptions would
also be sufficient; see Caplin and Nalebuff). Second, while the
predictions examined in our empirical work require only Proposition 1, we
find that one's intuitive grasp of the model is enhanced by the
comparative-static results we present in the text, the proofs of which rely
on log-concavity.7
prospective employers (and so plausibly also is unobservable to a court).
The assumption that long-term contracts cannot be enforced seems natural
because of the possibility that firm-specific productivity shocks may
occur: if a bad enough shock occurs at the beginning of period two, the
current employer will go bankrupt rather than live up to the contract.
Given our empirical focus on permanently displaced workers, such
productivity shocks are a realistic component of the model. For
simplicity, we do not include shocks in the model analyzed here; in
Appendix 1 we show that the empirical predictions are identical in the
analogous model that does include shocks.
One consequence of these two assumptions on contracting possibilities
is that it is immaterial whether workers are risk-neutral or risk-averse.
Another consequence is that, just as it is impossible to enforce contingent
or long-term contracts concerning wages, so too is it impossible to enforce
contingent or long-term contracts concerning layoffs. Thus, for example,
it is impossible to enforce a contract that guarantees that the employer
will not lay off any workers and will pay them all some fixed second-period
wage w2.
(4) Timing: The crux of the model is the sequence of events between
the two periods. After observing a given worker's first-period output, the
current employer decides whether to lay off or retain the worker. If the
worker is laid off then the current employer has no further èontact with
the worker; in particular, there is no possibility of recall. Ifthe
currentemployer wishes to retain the worker, however, then the following
wage-setting game ensues. First, the current employer offers the worker a
second-period wage. Second, prospective employers observe that the worker8
was not laid off by the first-period employer, but do not observe the
current employer's second-period wage offer. Third, prospective employers
simultaneously offer the worker second-period wages. And fourth, the
worker chooses the highest wage offered (and chooses the offer of the
current employer in case of a tie).
We have simplified the analysis considerably by restricting the space
of signals available to the informed party: prospective employers observe
the current employer's decision to lay off or retain a worker, but do not
observe the current employer's wage offer to retained workers.
Fortunately, our simple model yields precisely the same empirical
predictions as do many alternative models of the timing and extent of wage
offers by the firm and counteroffers by prospective employers; in
particular, it is straightforward to show that identical empirical
predictions arise if the current employer's wage offer to the worker is
assumed to be observed by the market.6
The analysis of the wage-setting game is straightforward. In
principle, the current employer's (unobservable) second-period wage offer
to a particular worker could vary with the employer's information about the
worker's ability, but in (a pure-strategy) equilibrium it does not: in
equilibrium, the current employer offers each worker whom it wishes to
retain exactly the second-period wage that prospective employers will later
offer these workers.
6More specifically, if the current employer'swage offer is observed
by the market, then in a pure-strategy equilibrium the retained workers are
those above the ability cutoff we identify and are paid the wage we
identify. In some equilibria, the wages paid to laid-off workers vary,
possibly with their abilities, but the average of these wages is always the
wage we identify, and it is this average that is measured in our (cross-
sectional) empirical work.9
Formally, suppose prospective employers conjecture that workers of
ability iq*areretained while workers of ability arelaid off.7




for retained and laid-off workers, respectively.
To retain a worker, the current employer must (at least) match the
outside wage offer given in (1). Therefore, the current employer's best
response is to retain workers of ability 'jsatisfying
(3) y2(q) -w2(R)￿ 0, or
(4) ￿
and to pay them w2(R). Note well that it is jabest response for the
current employer to pay different wages to different retained workers, even
if the differences in wages thereby correspond to differences in ability.
7Note that this formulation assumes that the market's conjecture about
the abilities of laid-off workers does not vary with the total number of
workers laid off by a particular firm (or with the total number of workers
retained by the firm). This assumption is consistent with the view that
the market observes only the aggregate pool of laid-off workers rather than
firm-specific information. Other equilibria exist if the market's
conjecture is allowed to vary with firm-specific information, but all of
these equilibria share the prediction that laid-off workers are from a
lower tail of the ability distribution.10
In equilibrium, the prospective employers' conjecture, ,*,mustbe
correct, so the righthand side of (4) must equal q*, or
(5) q*(l+s) —E(17I17*).
It is simple to show that (5) has a unique solution: At ,*— 0the
righthand side of (5) exceeds the left. At t*— qthe lefthand side
exceeds the right. And the derivative of the lefthand side with respect to
17*is(l+s), which exceeds the derivative of the righthand side, because
the latter is bounded above by 1 because f(r) is log-concave. Thisproves8
ProDosition 1: There exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium: workers of
ability r <17*are laid off by their first-period employers and then
receive the second-period wage w2(L) from the market.
Note that Proposition 1 guarantees that the equilibrium just described
is unique. In particular, given our assumptions, it is an equilibrium
for the firm to retain all of its workers for the second period, whatever
their ability levels, even though doing so would make efficient use of the
workers' firm-specific human capital. To see why this is so, recall that
neither contingent nor long-term contracts are feasible: the firm's wage
8The argument above begins by assuming that the market conjectures
that an upper tail of the ability distribution is retained and that the
complementary lower tail of the distribution is laid off. It is simple to
show, however, that for any conjecture by prospective employers about the
abilities of the retained workers, the current employer's best response is
still to retain an upper tail of the ability distribution and to pay all
retained workers the wage that will match the market's subsequent offer.
Thus, since in equilibrium the market's conjecture must be correct, the
conjecture must be of the form assumed in the text.11
offers and retention decisions between the first and second periods must be
(privately) optimal given the firm's information at that point. Thus, no
worker will be retained at a wage exceeding his or her (firm-specific)
productivity. But we argued above that there can be only one wage paid to
retained workers and that it must have the form given in (1) for some value
of ,*. Therefore, the wage paid to retained workers must exceed E(t), so
low-ability workers- --including(but not only) those with ability (l+s)r <
E(r)---will not be retained.
The unique equilibrium defined by (5) is especially tractable in the
case in which iisuniformly distributed on [0,1), because the conditional
expectations in (1) and (2) are linear in *.Simplecalculations show
that for this case (5) becomes
(6) —l/(l+2s).
Note that *approacheszero as s approaches infinity and that t*
approachesone as s approaches zero: only when firm-specific human capital
becomes infinitely important do inefficient layoffs disappear from the
equilibrium, while if there is no firm-specific human capital then the
entire workforce is laid off.9 (It is straightforward to show that these
results are not specific to the uniform distribution, but rather hold for
all log-concave distributions: implicitly differentiate (5) and observe
that d(E(I￿i*))/d,l* ￿ 1 because f() is log-concave.) The intuition
9Our assumption that the lowest possible value of r is zero makes a
(small) difference here. If the lowest value of ,werex > 0, then a large
but finite value of s would eliminate layoffs: if x(l+s) > E() then the
firm finds it profitable to retain the entire workforce.12
behind these results follows from the fact that- --asin any lemons problem,
from Akerlof (1970) on- -- thecurrent employer considers the productivity
(in that firm) of the marginal retained worker, while prospective employers
consider the productivity (in their firms) of the average retained worker.
Some level of firm-specific human capital (s >0)is necessary for these
two productivities to be equal.
It remains only to compute the re-employment wage of workers who lose
their jobs because of a plant closing. We assume that no inference about
the workers' abilities is warranted following a plant closing, so that
competition among prospective employers yields the wage
(7) w2(PC) —E(,).
Comparing (7) and (2) shows that w2(PC) >w2(L);
this inequality is the
main prediction of our model. In our empirical work, however, we consider
wage changes as well as re-employment wages. In our model, competition
among employers and the symmetric information before period one yield a
single first-period wage w1 for all workers, independent of ability.




3. Emt,irical Analysis of the Wages of Distlaced Workers
In this section, we provide evidence on the wages of male displaced13
workers,1° using data from the January 1984 and January 1986 Displaced
Workers Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey) We examine
how the change in wages, the pre-displacement wage, and the post-
displacement wage vary with the cause of displacement and with pre-
displacement occupation.
A. Data Descriition
We examine a pooled sample of male workers between the ages of 20 and
61 who were permanently displaced from a private-sector, full-time, non-
agricultural job because of a plant closing, slack work, or a position or
shift that was eliminated; we classify as layoffs those displaced because
of slack work or a position or shift that was eliminated. Workers
displaced from construction jobs were also eliminated from the sample since
it is difficult to formulate an appropriate definition of permanent
displacement from a construction job. For most of this section, the sample
is restricted to those individuals who were re-employed in wage-and-salary
10We focus on males displaced from full-time jobs in an attempt to
identify a sample of workers with strong attachments to the labor market.
This allows us to focus on the impact of the lemons effect on wages alone
rather than also jointly modeling the impact on labor-force participation.
11Workers in the January 1984 DWS permanently lost a job between
January 1979 and January 1984. Workers in the January 1986 DWS permanently
lost a job between January 1981 and January 1986. Individuals enter the
DWS if they lost a job in the five years prior to the survey because of
plant closing, an employer going out of business, or a layoff from which he
or she was not recalled. Interviewers for the DWS were instructed that if
an individual was fired from a job for cause then the individual should not
be included in the DWS. If a worker lost more than one job in the five
years prior to the survey, the survey questions refer to the lost job he or
she had held the longest. See U.S. Department of Commerce (1986) for
further details on the design and implementation of the DWS surveys.14
employment12 at the surveydate andwho had re-employment earnings of at
least $40 a week; at the end of the section, we address the potential
sample-selection bias arising from the fact that we exclude from the sample
workers not re-employed at the survey date.
Basic descriptive statistics for our sample of displaced workers are
presented in Table 1. The sample is approximately evenly split between
those displaced through plant closings and those displaced by layoffs. The
vast majority (79 percent) of those whom we classify as displaced by
layoffs were displaced because of slack work. The major measured
difference between workers displaced by plant closings and those displaced
by layoffs is that, on average, the former had been on their pre-
displacement jobs substantially longer (2.2 more years). This suggests
that seniority rules may be important in layoff decisions. Other measured
differences between workers displaced by plant closings and those displaced
by layoffs are: on average, the former have shorter spells of joblessness
following displacement, are more likely to have found new jobs without an
intervening spell of unemployment, and are more likely to have received
advance notification of job loss.
The earnings loss for the typical displaced worker in the sample is
substantial. The mean change in the log of real weekly earnings is -0.16
for the whole sample, and does not differ much between those displaced by
plant closings and those displaced by layoffs. Much evidence indicates,
however, that the earnings losses of displaced workers rise substantially
with pre-displacement tenure (e.g., Kletzer, 1988; Podgursky and Swaim,
12Unfortunately, the CPS does not provide current earnings information
for those workers who entered self-employment.Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Displaced Workers Data Set
January 1984 and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Surveys









Layoff —1 0.53 0.00 1.00
Previous Tenure in 4.73 5.87 3.72
years (6.00) (7.03) (4.68)
Change in Log Real -0.164 -0.160 -0.168
Weekly Earnings (0.50) (0.49) (0.51)
Log of Previous 5.94 5.94 5.93
Weekly Earnings (0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
Log of Current 5.77 5.78 5.76
Weekly Earnings (0.54) (0.54) (0.48)
Weeks of Joblessness 21.35 19.61 22.89
after displacement (25.71) (25.21) (26.05)
No unemp. after 0.14 0.19 0.10
displacement —1
Advance Notification 0.51 0.56 0.47
of Displacement —1
Years of Schooling 12.62 12.41 12.81
(2.40) (2.46) (2.33)
Age -Education-6 12.38 13.67 11.23
at Displacement (10.33) (10.85) (9.71)
White Collar in 0.34 0.34 0.35
Previous Job —1
Prev.Occ.Manuf.— 1 0.53 0.51 0.54
Sample Size 3427 1614 1813
position eliminated.
deflator.
aReason for displacement was slack work or shift or
All weekly earnings figures are deflated by the GNP15
1987; and Topel, 1988). Thus, the fact that the earnings losses of workers
displaced by layoffs and by plant closings are similar despite the higher
average pre-displacement tenure of those displaced by plant closings
suggests that a lemons effect may be operating.
The information content of a layoff depends on whether the employer
has some discretion with respect to whom to lay off. In the presence of a
layoff-by-seniority rule, for example, there may be little or no
information concerning a worker's ability revealed by the fact that the
worker was laid off. Most jobs covered by collective-bargaining agreements
are governed by layoff-by-seniority rules, but many nonunion jobs are not
governed by such rules.13 This suggests examining whether the gap between
the wage losses from layoffs versus those from plant closings is larger in
sub-samples where employers are likely to have more discretion with respect
14
to whom to lay off.
Because many fewer white- than blue-collar jobs are covered by
collective-bargaining agreements,15 we presume that the degree of
13Abraham and Medoff (1984), for instance, find that (1) 92 percent of
union firms have written rules to deal with permanent layoffs while only 24
percent of nonunion firms have such written layoff policies, and that (2)
58 percent of nonunion firms have a practice of sometimes laying off a more
senior worker if a junior worker is believed to be worth more on net, as
compared to 17 percent of union employers.
14
Unfortunately, the Displaced Workers Supplements do not provide
information on whether a worker's pre-displacement job was covered by a
collective-bargaining agreement.
15We used all twelve outgoing rotationgroups from the 1983 Current
Population Survey to tabulate unionization rates by occupation for a sample
of workers comparable to our DWS sample. We included in our sample 20 to
61 year-old, male, full-time, private-sector employees not working in
agriculture or construction. Workers were classified as unionized if they
were union members and/or working in employment covered by a collective-
bargaining agreement. We find that 10.4 percent of white-collar workers
were unionized, compared to 38.5 percent of blue-collar workers; see Table16
discretion over whom to lay off is likely to be higher in white- than in
blue-collar jobs. Differences in the characteristics and displacement
experiences of displaced workers by cause of displacement are presented
separately for white- and blue-collar workers in Table 2. The difference
in average pre-displacenient tenure between workers displaced by plant
closings and those displaced by layoffs is significantly smaller for white-
collar workers than it is for blue-collar workers (1.3 versus 2.6 years).
This suggests that strict layoff-by-seniority rules are less important and
employer discretion is more important for layoff decisions concerning
white-collar workers than for those involving blue-collar workers.16 The
significantly lower fraction of white- than of blue-collar layoff victims
who received advance notification of displacement (0.41 versus 0.51) also
suggests that white-collar layoffs are less likely to be governed by
collective-bargaining agreements, which often include formal
prenotification requirements and formally limit employer choice with
respect to whom to layoff.
Table 2 also reveals that the pattern of (raw) earnings losses for
white-collar workers fits the predictions of our model: pre-displacement
3 for the mapping from one-digit occupations to these white-collar and
blue-collar aggregates.
16We also computed the difference naverage pre-displacement tenure
between workers displaced by plant closings and those displaced by layoffs
for one-digit pre-displacement occupations rather than for our white- and
blue-collar occupational aggregates. Among white-collar workers, the
average difference in tenure (in years) is: managers and administrators —
1.4;professional and technical workers —1.6;clerical workers —1.2;and
sales workers —1.2.Among blue-collar workers, the average (in years) is:
craft and kindred workers2.7; operatives (except in transportation)
2.8; transport operatives —2.2;laborers —3.1;and service workers —1.4.
Thus, with the exception of service workers, the white- versus and blue-
collar division of the sample closely matches the division of the sample in
terms of this average difference in pre-displacement tenure.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics By Broad Occupation
January 1984 and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Surveys
Males Re-employed At Survey Date in Wage and Salary Employment
Means (Standard Error of Mean)
White Collar Blue Collar
Plant Plant a a
Variable Closing Layoff Closing Layoff
Previous Tenure in 5.17 3.84 6.23 3.66
years (0.28) (0.20) (0.22) (0.13)
Change in Log Real -0.068 -0.125 -0.208 -0.191
Weekly Earnings (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log of Previous 6.06 6.05 5.88 5.87
Weekly Earnings (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Log of Current 5.99 5.93 5.67 5.68
Weekly Earnings (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Weeks of Joblessness 13.96 18.36 22.54 25.29
after displacement (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) (0.81)
No unemp. after 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.09
displacement —1 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Advance Notification 0.55 0.41 0.56 0.51
of Displacement1 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Years of Schooling 13.87 14.21 11.65 12.07
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Age -Education-6 13.04 11.82 13.99 10.92
at Displacement (0.44) (0.40) (0.34) (0.28)
Prev.Occ.Manuf.— 1 0.35 0.39 0.60 0.62
Sample Size 552 627 1062 1186
aReason for displacement was slack work or shift or position eliminated.
The white-collar sample consists of workers with pre-displacement jobs as
managers and administrators, professional and technical workers, clerical
workers, or sales workers. The blue-collar sample consists of workers with
pre-displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers,
transport operatives, or service workers. Weekly earnings figures are
deflated by the GNP deflator.17
earnings do not differ much by cause of displacement, while post-
displacement earnings are significantly lower (by 6 percent) for those
displaced by layoffs. Furthermore, for blue-collar workers the analogous
difference in post-displacement earnings is not significantly different
from zero, again as predicted by the model.
B. Earnings Equations
The raw earnings changes suggest that some stigma is attached to being
laid off when employers are likely to be able to pick whom to lay off, but
that no stigma is attached to being laid off from jobs where formal rules
are more likely to govern layoff decisions. To continue to assess the
empirical support for the predictions of our model, we present estimates in
Table 3 of the coefficient on a layoff dummy in regressions of (i) the
change in wages, (ii) pre-displacement earnings, and (iii) post-
displacement earnings on a standard set of worker characteristics, year-of-
displacement dummies, region dummies, a dummyvariablefor advance
notification of displacement, and one-digit pre-displacement occupation and
industry dummies.17
The estimates for the whole sample presented in Table 3 provide some
support for the model's basic prediction: the estimate in column (1)
reveals that workers displaced through layoffs experience approximately 4
percent larger wage reductions than do workers with the same measured pre-
17The wage-change and post-displacementearnings equations also
include years since displacement. We have also estimated the wage-change
and post-displacement earnings equations replacing the years-since-
displacement variable with a full set of interactions between the year-of-
displacement dummies and a survey-date dummyvariable.The results
reported in Table 3 are not appreciably affected by this change in the
specification.Table 3: Coefficients on Layoff Dummy in Earnings Equations
January1984and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Surveys
Males Re-employed At Survey Date
Dependent Variable —(1)Log(Current wage/Previous wage),









































The reported regressions include a spline function in previous tenure (with
breaks at one, two, three, and six years), education, a dummy for advance
notification of displacement, year-of-displacement dummies, 7 previous-
industry dummies, 8 previous-occupation dummies, experience (age -education
-6)and its square, a marriage dummy, a nonwhite dummy, and 3 region
dummies. Columns (1) and (3) also include years since displacement. The
white-collar sample consists of workers with pre-displacement jobs as
managers and administrators, professional and technical workers, clerical
workers, or sales workers. The blue-collar sample consists of workers with
pre-displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers,
transport operatives, or service workers. The low-union sample consists of
workers in industry-occupation cells with unionization rates of less than
25.5 percent in 1983; all worker in industry-occupation cells with higher
unionization rates are in the high-union sample. Earnings are deflated by
the GNP deflator. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.18
displacement characteristics who were displaced in plant closings. This
effect is perhaps stronger than it might appear because it is net of two
competing effects: first, as mentioned in the Introduction, workers
involved in plant closings seem more likely to be located in distressed
local labor markets; and second, many of the layoffs in the sample are
likely to have been determined by strict seniority systems. On the other
hand, columns (2) and (3) reveal that the estimate in column (1) arises
both from the slightly higher pre-displacement earnings and from the
slightly lower post-displacement earnings of those displaced by layoffs.
Our model predicts only the lower post-displacement earnings; the higher
pre-displacement earnings are consistent with the existence of wage
concessions before a plant closing, as well as with a compensating
difference for layoff (but not plant-closing!) risk.
Separate estimates of the effect of cause of displacement on the wage
changes of white- and blue-collar workers are also presented in Table 3.
Among white-collar workers, re-employment earnings are estimated to be more
than 6 percent lower for those displaced by layoffs than for those
displaced by plant closings; no similar difference is apparent for blue-
collar workers. Thus, for white-collar workers there is fairly strong
evidence supporting the lemons effect (in the re-employment wage equation)
and no evidence supporting the wage-concession or compensating-difference
effects (in the pre-displacement wage equation).
An alternative approach to determining whether workers were displaced
from jobs that were likely to be governed by formal layoff-by-seniority
rules is to classify workers by the likelihood that their pre-displacement
jobs were unionized. Since the DWS does not provide information on whether19
a worker's pre-displaceinent job was unionized, we used the extent of
unionization in a worker's pre-displacement industry-occupation cell to
determine whether the worker's pre-displacement job was likely to be
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. We used all twelve outgoing
rotation groups from the 1983 Current Population Survey (the Full Year
sample) to generate a sample of workers comparable to our DWS sample and
then to compute unionization rates for white- and blue-collar workers in
each three-digit industry (as defined in the 1980 Census of Population))8
We then classified workers into high- and low-union sub-samples depending
on whether their pre-displacement industry-occupation cell had a
unionization rate above or below the sample median rate of 25.5 percent.
The mean unionization rates in the high- and low-union sub-samples are 50.3
and 9.7 percent, respectively.
Estimates of the effect of cause of displacement on the earnings of
workers by unionization class are presented in the last two rows of Table
3. The layoff coefficients for the low-union sample are qualitatively
similar to but not as large as the analogous coefficients for the white-
sample. In particular, the re-employment earnings of low-union workers
displaced by layoffs are estimated to be approximately 4.5 percent lower
than are those of low-union workers displaced by plant-closings, while no
such gap is apparent in the, high-union sample.
In sum, the estimates in Table 3 are consistent with the view that the
18Unionization rates werecomputed for 420 industry-occupation cells
using a 210-industry by 2-occupation (i.e., white- and blue-collar)
classification scheme. The sample was restricted to 20 to 61 year-old,
male, full-time, private-sector employees not working in agriculture or
construction. The sample consisted of 53,972 observations satisfying these
criteria. Workers were classified as unionized if they were union members
and/or employed in a job covered by a collective-bargaining agreement.20
information content of a layoff is greater where employers have more
discretion over whom to lay off. As noted in the Introduction, however,
the information content of a layoff also is greater where employers have
better information about workers' abilities. Since some time may have to
elapse before the current employer can accurately evaluate a worker's
ability (perhaps because the employer is unable to learn the worker's
ability until the worker learns the job), it may be that layoffs after
brief employment spells signal little information to prospective employers.
To study this possibility, we explored whether the lemons effect associated
with layoffs differs for workers with more versus less pre-displacement job
tenure. We re-estimated the regressions in rows 1 through 3 of Table 3
after replacing the layoff dummy with two interactions between the layoff
dummy and two pre-displacement tenure dummies- --alow-tenure dummy for pre-
displacement tenure less than two years and a high-tenure dummy for pre-
displacement tenure of at least two years. The results of these
regressions are presented in Table 419
The estimates in Table 4 reveal that the effect of a layoff (versus a
plant closing) on a displaced worker's wages varies dramatically with pre-
displacement tenure. For the whole sample and for white- and blue-collar
workers considered separately, workers with less than two years of tenure
experience essentially no (statistically significant) differential effect
from a layoff. Not surprisingly, therefore, the estimates for workers with
19We alsocomputed the analogous estimates using low- and high-tenure
dummies defined as less than and at least Qii year of pre-displacement
tenure, respectively. Because the sample of such low-tenure workers is
extremely small, the estimates for the low-tenure sub-sample are quite
imprecise and the estimates for the high-tenure sub-sample are very similar
to the estimates for the whole sample presented in Table 3.Table 4: Coefficients on Interaction of Layoff Dummy with Low- and High-
Tenure Dummies in Earnings Equations
January 1984 and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Surveys
Males Re-employed At Survey Date
Low-Tenure —lessthan 2 years of tenure on pre-displacement job
High-Tenure —atleast 2 years of tenure on pre-displacement job
Dependent Variable —(1)Log(Current wage/Previous wage),

































































The reported regressions include a spline function in previous tenure (with
breaks at one, two, three, and six years), education, a dummy for advance
notification of displacement, year-of-displacement dummies, 7 previous-
industry dummies, 8 previous-occupation dummies, experience (age -education
-6)and its square, a marriage dummy,anonwhite dummy, and 3 region
dummies. Columns (1) and (3) also include years since displacement. The
white-collar sample consists of workers with pre-displacement jobs as
managers and administrators, professional and technical workers, clerical
workers, or sales workers. The blue-collar sample consists of workers with
pre-displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers,
transport operatives, or service workers. Earnings are deflated by the GNP
deflator. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.21
at least twoyearsof tenure are amplified versions of the estimates that
do not allow for tenure differences (presented in Table 3). Forhigh-
tenure white-collar workers, for example, the extra loss inpost-
displacement earnings following a layoff rather than a plantclosing is 8.2
percent rather than the 6.4 percent for all white-collar workersreported
in Table 3. As before, the analogous loss for high-tenure blue-collar
workers is zero, as is the influence of a layoff on the-displacement
earnings of high-tenure white-collar workers. Unlike in Table 3, however,
the influence of a layoff on the -displacementearnings of high-tenure
blue-collar workers is now (a statistically significant) 4percent rather
than (an insignificant) 2 percent.
C. Sensitivity Analyses
Since the equations presented in Table 3 were estimatedon the sample
of displaced workers who were re-employed at thesurvey date, the estimates
may potentially reflect sample-selection bias. We have taken two
approaches to probe the importance of this problem. First, we re-estimated
the models presented in Table 3 using thetwo-stage sample-selection bias
correction approach of Heckman (l979).20 The Heckit estimates of the
layoff-dummy coefficient are similar to the OLS estimates presented in
20There-employment probit equations in the first stage of the Heckit
procedure were estimated on our basic sample plus displaced males who were
unemployed, self-employed, or employed and earning less than $40 dollars a
week at the survey date. The re-employment probits included the same
variables as the independent variables in thewage regressions in Table 3.
Since we could not make a convincing exclusion restriction (i.e.,identify
a variable that affects the probability of re-employment at thesurvey date
but does not affect earnings), the Heckit modelsare identified only by the
nonlinearity of the sample-selection bias correction term (the inverse
Mills ratio).22-
Table 3 in all cases. For example, the Heckitestimates of the layoff-
dummy coefficients for white-collarworkers are -0.55 in the wage change
equation, -0.0093 in the pre-displacement earningsequation, and -0.064 in
the post-displacement earningsequation.21
As a second approach to the sample-selection problem, weexamined the
sub-sample of workers who were displaced at least two years priorto the
survey date. These workers havehad a substantial amount of time to find a
new job. Also, the effects of short-lived badmatches and temporary jobs
after displacement should be reduced. Estimates of the layoffcoefficient
for this sub-sample of displaced workers are presented in Table 5.The
layoff effects for white-collar workers displaced at least two yearsbefore
the survey date are similar to the analogous effects for the entire white-
collar sample, and the findings for the whole sample and for blue-collar
workers are in the spirit of the analogous results in Table 3.
In addition to sample-selection bias, a second potential bias arises
because the DWS asks respondents about events that occurred as long as five
years prior to the survey date. Thus, some respondents mayhave either
completely forgotten events that occurred in the distant past or remembered
such events but misreported the dates at which they occurred, or both.
Robert Topel has alerted us to one possible manifestation of this kind of
retrospection bias: a comparison of the layoffs reported in the 1984 and
1986 DWS's for the years these surveys have in common (1981-3) reveals that
21The Heckit estimates provide no evidence of statistically
significant selection bias in the pre- and post-displacement earnings
equations for white-collar workers nor in any of the equations for blue-
collar workers. The selection bias correction term enters moderately
significantly in the wage-change equation for white-collar workers (a
coefficient of 0.055 with a standard error of 0.31), although its inclusion
does not effect the estimate of the layoff-dummy coefficient.Table 5: Coefficients on Layoff Dummy in Earnings Equations
January 1984 and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Surveys
Males Displaced at Least 2 Years before the Survey Date
and Re-employed at the Survey Date
Dependent Variable —(1)Log(Current wage/Previous wage),





























The reported regressions include a spline function in previous tenure (with
breaks at one, two, three, and six years), education, a dummy for advance
notification of displacement, year-of-displacement dummies, 7 previous-
industry dummies, 8 previous-occupation dummies, experience (age -education
6) and its square, a marriage dummy,anonwhite dummy, and 3 region
dummies. Columns (1) and (3) also include years since displacement. The
white-collar sample consists of workers with pre-displacement jobs as
managers and administrators, professional and technical workers, clerical
workers, or sales workers. The blue-collar sample consists of workers with
pre-displacement jobs as craft and kindred workers, operatives, laborers,
transport operatives, or service workers. Earnings are deflated by the CNP
deflator. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.23
many more layoffs are reported inthe 1984 survey than in the 1986 survey,
while the analogous comparison of the plant closings reported at the two
survey dates reveals a much smallerdifference.22 One might hypothesize
that (i) this large difference between the layoffs reported in 1984 versus
those reported in 1986 results because some 1986 respondents have simply
forgotten layoffs that occurred between 1981 and 1983, (ii) these
forgotten layoffs were disproportionately those that did not result in
large earnings losses. (Implicit in this pair of hypotheses is the notion
that plant closings are memorable, even if they do not result in large
earnings losses.)
In Appendix 2, we describe a detailed investigation of the possibility
that such retrospection bias is an important factor behind our empirical
results. In brief, we find three reasons why retrospection bias appears
to be a problem here: First, while we cannot reject the possibility
that such a bias explains our results for the sample as a whole, the data
do not support the conjecture that such a bias explains our results for
white- versus blue-collar workers. Second, the presence of such a bias
would seem to suggest that the lemons effect should grow (in absolute
value) with years since displacement, but it does not. And third, the
effect of such a bias would seem to be reduced for workers displaced from
jobs with long pre-displacement tenure, but (as reported in Table 4) the
qualitative properties of our empirical results are not only preserved but
221n our sample (including those not re-employed at the survey date),
the layoffs reported in the 1984 DWS are 314, 504, and 484 for 1981-3,
respectively, while those reported in the 1986 DWS are 142, 258, and 188
for the same years. The plant closings reported in the 1984 DWS, in
contrast, are 238, 298, and 272 for 1981-3, respectively, while those
reported in the 1986 DWS are 227, 247, and 242 for the same years.24
even strengthened by focusing on workers with long pre-displacement tenure.
4. Unenrnlovment and Reason for Displacement
Like wage changes at displacement, the unemployment experiences of
displaced workers also appear to differ substantially by the reason for
displacement. In Table 1 we found that among permanently displaced workers
who were reemployed at the survey date those displaced by plant closings
were less likely to have experienced a spell of unemployment after
displacement and had fewer weeks of joblessness following displacement than
23
did workers displaced by layoffs.
Two explanations are available for the shorter unemployment spells
experienced by workers permanently displaced by plant closings relative to
those experienced by workers permanently displaced by layoffs. The first
explanation, due to Katz (1986), focuses on the importance of recall
expectations in the job-search behavior of the unemployed: workers
displaced by layoffs are more likely to think they may be recalled to their
pre-unemployment jobs than are workers displaced in plant closings; higher
recall expectations are likely to reduce the new-job-finding rate by
reducing search intensity and making workers choosier about new jobs. Katz
and Meyer (1988) find evidence in support of this view: in a sample of
unemployment insurance (UI) recipients in Missouri, workers who expected to
23These results are consistent with the earlier findings of Kruse
(1988) using the 1984 DWS. Similarly, Katz (1986) finds using a sample of
household heads from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that workers who
enter unemployment through layoffs have lower escape rates from
unemployment through the finding of new jobs than do those displaced
through plant closings.25
be recalled at the time of job loss have much lower (approximately 50
percent lower) new-job-finding rates than do workerswho did not expect to
be recalled.
The second explanation for the shorter unemployment spells experienced
by workers displaced by plant closings relative to those experienced by
workers permanently displaced by layoffs involves a simple extension of our
lemons model. The model developed in Section 2 yields predictions about
wage changes at displacement, but also predictsthat there will be no post-
displacement unemployment. The latter prediction arises for a simple
reason: for any belief about a worker's ability, there is always a wage low
enough that firms will be willing to hire the worker.
To generate post-displacement unemployment, the model could be changed
so that for sufficiently pessimistic beliefs about a worker's ability
either no firm is willing to hire the worker or it takes time for the
worker to find a firm that is willing to hire him or her. One could
imagine, for example, that some firms use technologies that are extremely
sensitive to the worker's ability, so that hiring a bad worker is
(essentially) infinitely costly, while other firms use technologies like
that described in Section 2, so that there always exists a wage low enough
to make the latter firms willing to hire a bad worker. Adding such
technological heterogeneity and a job-search mechanism to our lemons model
would yield positive (but finite) post-displacement unemployment durations.
The expected duration would be longer for workers displaced by layoffs
(again, because of the lemons effect) than for workers displaced by plant
closings.
In an attempt to assess the extent to which a lemons effect26
contributes to the longer unemployment spells experienced by workers
permanently displaced by layoffs relative to the spells experienced by
workers displaced in plant closings, we used the January 1986 DWS to
construct a sample of first spells of joblessness for 20 to 61 year-old
males permanently displaced from full-time, private-sector jobs not in
agriculture or construction.24 The sample contains 830 complete initial
spells of joblessness and 498 censored spells.
We analyze the duration of initial spells of joblessness for this
sample using formal hazard-model techniques. We parameterize the hazard
rate (i.e., the escape rate from joblessness) using a Weibull
specification. The hazard rate for individual i at time tisspecified as
(8) Ai(t) —atex(X6).
where X. is a vector of time-invariant covariates for individual i, a is 1
theWeibull duration-dependence parameter, and 6 is a vector of
parameters.25Let T be the length of individual jSunemploymentspell.
The Weibull specification of the hazard function implies that the log of
24The January 1984 DWSonly provides information on total weeks of
joblessness since displacement and so does not allow one to determine the
length of the initial spell of joblessness. The January 1986 DWS, in
contrast, provides information on the number of jobs held by a worker since
displacement. This variable and information on total weeks of joblessness
since displacement allow one to determine both the length of the initial
spell of joblessness for those employed in their first job since
displacement at the survey date and the censored length of the initial
spell for those who had not worked since displacement. The variable that
measures weeks of joblessness since displacement is top-coded at 99. We
treat initial spells of joblessness top-coded at 99 as being censored at 99
weeks.
25See Kalbfleisch and Prentice(1980, pp. 23-25 and 30-32) for a
discussion of the properties of the Weibull model.27
the failure time for i (i.e., Y —logT)can be written as a regression
model of the form
(9) —X.$+ac.,
where a —1/ais known as the Weibull scale parameter,—-a&,and c is
an error term with an extreme-value distribution (Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
1980, PP. 22-24).
Table 6 presents maximum-likelihood estimates of Weibull duration
models for the initial spell of joblessness following displacement for our
1986 DWS sample.26 For ease of interpretation, we present the estimates in
the form of the regression model in equation (9): we report the parameter
for each covariate X. The estimates presented in Table 6 thus can be
interpreted as the effects of the covariates on the expected log duration
of joblessness.
The coefficient estimate for the layoff dummy in column (1) of Table 6
indicates that workers permanently displaced by layoffs have approximately
25 percent longer initial unemployment spells than do those displaced in
plant closings. This finding is consistent with our (extended) lemons
model, but of course also is consistent with a recall-expectations model.
In columns (2) through (4) of Table 6 we attempt to isolate the effect due
26
One cannot directly compare the estimates in Table 6 with those by
Katz (1986) and Katz and Meyer (1988), because the samples and estimation
strategies differ in important ways. The Katz and Katz-Meyer data sets
include recalled workers, so those studies estimate models that treat
recall as a competing risk (i.e., as a second way that the unemployment
spell can end). Because the DWS does not include recalled workers, our
estimates of the effects of proxies for recall expectations on unemployment
duration are likely to be biased towards zero.Table 6: Effects of Selected Variables on the Duration of
the First Spell of Joblessness Following Displacement
January 1986 CPS Displaced Workers Survey
Males with only one spell of Joblessness Since Displacement
at the Survey Date
Dependent Variable —Log(Weeksof Joblessness)
Weibull Duration Model Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Layoff —1. .248 .244 .352 .323
(.086) (.108) (.106) (.126)
Layoff *WhiteCollar - - - .049 - - -
(.168)
Layoff *HighUnion - - - - - .299 - -
(.147)
Layoff *FractionUnion - - - - - - - .358
(.345)






Previous Tenure in .037 .034 .034 .033
years (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Log ofPrevious - .301 - .339 - .331 - .333
Real Weekly Earnings (.100) (.099) (.099) (.099)
Weibuli. Scale 1.146 1.139 1.137 1.139
Parameter (a) (.033) (.032) (.032) (.032)
Log Likelihood -1831.3 -1822.2 -1820.2 -1821.7
The reported models were estimated by maximum likelihood with left censoring
explicitly treated using the LIFEREG procedure in SAS. The sample size is
k228. The reported specifications include education, a dummy for advance
notificationof displacement, year-of-displacement dummies, 7 previous-
industry dummies, 8 previous-occupation dummies, experience(age -education
-6)and its square, a marriage dummy, a nonwhite dummy, and 3 region
duinntjes. Fraction union is the 1983 fraction unionized of the worker's pre-
displacement industry-occupation cell. High union equals one for workers
displaced from industry-occupation cells where the fraction unionized was
greater than 0.255 in 1983; it equals 0 otherwise. Earnings are deflated by
theGNP deflator. The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.28
solely to the lemons model.
The estimates in column (2) indicate that the effectobserved in
column (1) for the whole sample also appears in boththe white- and blue-
collar sub-samples of our data set: workers permanently displaced by
layoffs experience significantly longerinitial unemployment spells than do
workers displaced by plant closings, regardless of whetherthe displacement
is from a white- or blue-collar job. (More precisely,the point estimates
in column (2) suggest that the effect is slightly smallerfor white-collar
workers, but not statistically significantly so.) Sincewhite-collar
workers are much less likely to expect to be recalled than are blue-collar
workers,27 the similarity in the impact of the layoff dummy on unemployment
durations for the two groups suggests that a lemons effect may be
influencing the post-displacement unemployment duration of white-collar
workers permanently displaced by layoffs. The lemons effect appears to be
compensating for the reduced importance of the layoff dummy for white-
collar workers that would be predicted by the recall-expectations model
alone.
The estimates in columns (3) and (4) are analogous to those in column
(2), except that we use a second approach to attempt to define a sub-sample
of jobs that are likely to be governed by formal layoff-by-seniority rules,
27Evidence on differences in the importance of recall expectations for
white-collar and blue-collar displaced workers is available from a sample
of UI recipients from Missouri and Pennsylvania in 1979-80. This sample,
which is described in detail in Katz and Meyer (1988), contains direct
information on whether workers expected to be recalled when they filed for
UI benefits. For this sample, we find that 58 percent of blue-collar
workers who had spells that ended in a new job initially expected to be
recalled by their previous employer, while only 25 percent of the
comparable sample of white-collar workers expected to be recalled. This
suggests that the recall-expectations model should be substantially less
important for white-collar workers.29
and therefore not likely to be subject to a lemons effect. As in Section
38, we classify each worker in terms of a measure of the extent of
unionization in the worker's pre-displacement industry and occupation (as
described in footnote 17).
In column (3) our measure of the extent of unionization is a dummy
variable equal to one if the unionization rate exceeds 25.5 percent (the
median of the sample described in Section 38). We find that for workers
from low-unionization pre-displacement industries and occupations, those
displaced by layoffs experience significantly longer (approximately 35
percent longer) post-displacement unemployment durations than do those
displaced by plant closings. We also find that the effect of displacement
by layoff on unemployment duration is statistically significantly different
for low- versus for high-unionization workers: for workers from high-
unionization pre-displacement industries and occupations, those displaced
by layoffs experience only 5 percent longer unemployment spells than do
those displaced by plant closings. In column (4) we interact the layoff
dummy with the unionization rate (i.e., the continuous variable that
underlies the unionization dummy described above) of the worker's pre-
displacement industry and occupation. The results for are qualitatively
similar to those reported in column (3).
Because workers from high-unionization pre-displacement industries and
occupations are much more likely to be covered by layoff-by-seniority
rules, the lemons effect ought to be much weaker for this sub-sample. The
findings reported in columns (3) and (4) are consistent with this view.
Interestingly, it is somewhat more difficult to reconcile these findings
with the recall-expectations model. Because of the well known importance30
of the layoff-recall process in the unionized sector of the United States
labor market, one might expect that workers laid off from high-unionization
pre-displacement industries and occupations would experiencemuch longer
unemployment durations than would high-unionization workers displaced by
plant closings, rather than only 5 percent longer as weestimate in column
(3). It could be, however, that layoffs of high-unionizationworkers
during this period occurred primarily in declining industries, sothat
recall expectations were low.
In sum, the evidence presented in Table 6 shows that workers
permanently displaced by layoffs experience significantly longer initial
unemployment durations following displacement than do workers displaced by
plant closings. While both our (extended) lemons model and a recall-
expectations model are capable of explaining this fact, we find that the
result persists for sub-samples that seem likely to fit the lemons model
but unlikely to fit the recall-expectations model.
5. Summary and Interpretation
In this paper, we develop and find modest empirical support for an
asymmetric-information model of layoffs. The model is based on a seemingly
plausible form of asymmetric information: a worker's current employer is
assumed to be better informed about the worker's productive ability than
prospective employers are. The key feature of the model is that when firms
have discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market will infer that
laid-off workers are of low ability. Since no such negative inference
should be attached to workers displaced in a plant closing, our model31
predicts that the post-displacement wages of otherwise observationally
equivalent workers will be higher for those displaced by plant closings
than for those displaced by layoffs. A simple extension of our model
predicts that the average post-displacement unemployment spell of otherwise
observationally equivalent workers will be shorter for those displaced by
plant closings than for those permanently displaced by layoffs.
Using data on a large sample of permanently displaced workers, we find
two kinds of evidence consistent with the lemons effect predicted by our
model. First, the post-displacement earnings of white-collar workers who
are displaced by layoffs are significantly lower than those of white-collar
workers displaced by plant closings. Second, white-collar workers
permanently displaced by layoffs endure post-displacement unemployment
spells that are significantly longer than those endured by white-collar
workers displaced by plant closings. The fact that this evidence is
consistent with our model may bode well for future theoretical and
empirical work on wages and mobility based on the information asymmetry we
analyze. Alternatively, our empirical results can be interpreted as
support for various plausible symmetric-information models, as follows.
To be concrete, suppose that at the beginning of a worker's career,
information about the worker's productive ability is imperfect but
symmetric: the worker, the firm, and the market all hold the same
(imprecise) belief.28 Suppose further that as the worker's career
28Such an information structure would ariseif, for example, the
worker's schooling is a noisy indicator of the worker's productive ability
and, unlike the familiar Spence formulation, the combination of the
worker's lack of experience in the labor market and firms' wealth of
experience in evaluating new workers implies that the worker and all the
firms are equally able to predict the worker's productive ability.32
progresses, the worker, the firm, and the market all observe the same
information about the worker's performance. Then at any point in the
worker's career, the worker, the firm, and the market all will hold a
common belief about the worker's ability.
In order for such a symmetric-information model to yield the desired
predictions about the effect of cause of displacement on re-employment
wages and unemployment durations, the model must include a description of
why layoffs occur. One reason layoffs might occur is that wages are sticky
(perhaps because wages are attached to jobs, as in an internal labor
market), so that the firm cannot reduce the worker's wage even if the
worker's productivity turns out to be much lower than was at first
expected. In this case, if the firm suffers an adverse productivity or
demand shock, it may prefer to lay off the worker rather than to retain the
worker at the original wage. Because information is symmetric, the market
does not learn from the layoff er se (unlike in our lemons model), but the
market does take the opportunity that a layoff presents to reduce the
worker's wage.
A second reason layoffs might occur in a symmetric-information model
involves sorting. Suppose, for instance, that there are two industries: in
industry A, output is very sensitive to ability, while in industry B,
output is relatively insensitive to ability. Thus, if information about
workers' productive abilities were perfect, then high-ability workers would
be employed in industry A and low-ability workers would be employed in
industry B. As described above, however, information about workers'
abilities is imperfect but improves over time. As a result, at the
beginning of their careers, workers who appear to be of high-33
(respectively, low-) ability are employed in industry A (respectively, B).
Over time, as new information about workers' productive abilities becomes
available, mobility endogenously improves the sorting of workers into
industries.29 Two kinds of mobility occur: workers who perform
surprisingly well move from industry B to A, while those who perform
surprisingly poorly move from industry A to B. If we call the former a
quit and the latter a layoff, then this sorting model also generates the
main empirical prediction of our lemons model: laid-off workers receive low
re-employment wages.
Unlike these sticky-wage and sorting models, many other symmetric-
information models do provide convincing explanations for why layoffs
occur. In models in which a worker of a given ability is equally
productive in all firms, for instance, the equilibrium response to bad news
about a worker's ability is a wage reduction, not a layoff. Similarly, in
matching models in which match quality with one firm provides no
information about match quality with any other firm (as in Jovanovic,
1979), bad news about match quality at the current firm motivates a
separation that looks more like a quit than a layoff, and can even result
in a wage increase rather than a wage reduction. Our asymmetric-
information model, in contrast, strongly motivates a layoff rather than a
wage reduction in response to bad news about a worker's ability: in
29See Gibbons and Katz (1987) for a precise statement of this model,
which is a dynamic version of Roy's (1951) model, extended to include
imperfect information, learning, and endogenous mobility. The model is
closely related to the models of wages and turnover developed by Jovanovic
(1979) and MacDonald (1982) except that: (i) in this model (as opposed to
Jovanovic's) a worker's performance in one industry determines not only the
expected value of staying in that industry but also the expected value of
moving to the other industry; and (ii) in this model (as opposed to
MacDonald's) ability measures absolute rather than comparative advantage.34
equilibrium, the firm cannot retain low-ability workers at a low wage:if
it could, it would also retain high-ability workers at the low wage, which
would destroy the market's willingness to allow any workers to be retained
at the low wage.
In sum, the predictions of our lemons model also can be generated by
some (but not all!) symmetric-information models. Our empirical results
therefore are XiQ. conclusive proof that asymmetric information plays an
important role in the labor market. Rather, we interpret the results as a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for confidence in modelsbased on
asymmetric information about workers' abilities: had our estimates rejected
our model, it would have cast serious doubt on the entire family of models
based on this kind of asymmetric information (as well as on the symmetric-
information models that generate the same predictions). Unfortunately, the
nature of asymmetric information seems to imply that direct empirical tests
of its importance are not possible, so indirect tests of the kind presented
here may be all that is possible.35
APPENDIX1:Productivity Shocks
In the model in the text, layoffs occur even though they waste firm-
specific human capital. This inefficiency is a consequence of the
assumption that employers cannot commit to a particular kind of long-term
contract: we assume that it is impossible to enforce a contract signed at
the beginning of period one that specifies that workers will be laid off
at the beginning of period two. In this Appendix we introduce a reason why
the firm may be unable to commit to such a long-term contract: at the
beginning of period two there is a firm-specific productivity shock that
could be severe enough to bankrupt the firm if it were forced to retain all
its first-period employees.
To model such a shock, let the second-period output of a worker of
ability tbey2(i) —(l+s),+8if the worker remains with the first-
period employer, but y2() —rif the worker changes employers. Thus, 8
represents a firm-specific productivity (or demand) shock: the worker's
productivity with prospective employers is unaffected by 8. Furthermore,
in this (sketch of a) model the prospective employers do not experience
firm-specific shocks of their own.3o
Assume that 8 is observed by the current employer and by prospective
employers at the beginning of period two, before the current employer
decides whether to lay off or retain a particular worker. Then all of the
301n a complete model, eachemployer would experience an independent
second-period productivity shock, drawn (say) from a single distribution
g(8). Given the constant returns to scale assumed above, the bidding by
prospective employers for laid-off workers would be won by the employer
with the highest realization of 8. A more natural model would allow for
decreasing returns to scale. We expect, however, that in all such models
the qualitative results derived in this sub-section would continue to hold.36
analysis summarized in equations (l)--(4) above carries over, exceptthat
the equilibrium cutoff now depends on 8: the current employer retains
workers of ability v,,*(e). As before, (7) holds, so w2(PC) -w2(L)
> 0,
where w2(L) —E071,7<fl*(8)),analogously to (2). Furthermore, we have
Proosition1: In the unique pure-strategy equilibrium, *() is given by:
(i) for 8 < -sj, ,7*(8) —0;(ii) for -s ￿ 8 ￿ E(), ,7*(8) solves
(A.l) ,7*(8)(l+s) + 8 —
and(iii) for 8 > E(), ,*(8) —,. For-sty < 8 < E(t7), *(e) decreases
with 8, so w2(PC) -w2(L)
increases with 8.
Proof: Parts (i) and (iii) are straightforward. Uniqueness in (ii)
follows as in the text. Monotonicity in (ii) follows by totally
differentiating (A.l), which yields (l+s) 17*' + 1 —17*'d(E(,117￿17*))/d,7*,
where 17*' —d17*/de.By log-concavity, d(E(17Ifl17*))/d17* ￿ 1, so 17*' < 0.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for the result that 17*(8) decreases in 8 is simple: in
bad times, employers lay off many workers, and the associated inference
about these workers' abilities is not as severe. In the extreme case, the
shock is large enough to generate a plant closing, and no adverse inference
is made about the abilities of the displaced workers.37
APPENDIX2: RetrosDection Bias
Inthis Appendix we describe a detailed investigation into the
retrospection bias summarized in hypotheses (i) and (ii) in the text. Such
bias could be responsible for our finding for the sanmie as a whole (in row
1 of Table 3) that layoffs lead to lower post-displacement earnings than do
plant closings. As described in the text, however, we also find (in rows 2
and 3 of Table 3) that the lemons effect following a layoff is much more
pronounced for white-collar workers and much less pronounced for blue-
collar workers. We find it difficult to modify hypotheses (i) and (ii) so
as to account for this latter finding in a plausible way. Furthermore, the
evidence suggests that the retrospection bias is severefor white-
than for blue-collar workers.31
In addition to noting that our results for white- versus blue-collar
workers do not appear to be driven by retrospection bias, we also attempted
to assess the severity of the retrospection bias in two other ways. First,
we re-estimated the regressions reported in rows 1 through 3 of Table 3
after replacing the layoff dummy with five interactions between the layoff
dummy and the five years-since-displacement dummies.32 In the spirit of
311n our sample of white-collar workers (including those not re-
employed at the survey date), the layoffs reported in the 1984 DWS are 73,
140, and 159 for 1981-3, respectively, while those reported in the 1986 DWS
are 43, 81, and 73 for the same years. For blue-collar'-workers, the
layoffs reported in 1984 are 241, 364, and 325 for 1981-3, as compared to
and 99, 177, and 115 reported in 1986. If there is a difference between
white- and blue-collar workers, therefore, it would seem to be that white-
collar workers forget fewer layoffs. (Note that this qualitative
comparison holds even if one focuses on 1981 alone, and so would not seem
to be attributable to occupational differences in recall rates.)
32Recall that the DWS asks workers about their labor-market
experiences during the five years preceding the survey date.38
hypotheses (i) and (ii), one might suppose that layoffs that occurred
further in the past are remembered (and reported) only if they resulted in
more severe earnings losses, in which case the wage-change and post-
displacement earnings regressions analogous to columns (1) and (3) of Table
3 should yield coefficients on these five interactions that increase (in
absolute value) with years since displacement. We find that nothing like
this monotonic pattern of coefficients emerges from the data. Rather, a
typical pattern is that the strongest effects are in the first and third
years, while the effects in the second, fourth, and fifth years are
approximately equal and distinctly smaller than the first- and third-year
effects.
In our final attempt to assess the impact of retrospection bias on our
results, we re-estimated the regressions in Table 4 after redefining the
low-tenure (resp., high-tenure) dummy to refer to workers with less than
(resp., at least) three (rather than j)yearsof pre-displacement job
tenure. We did this because, in the spirit of hypotheses (i) and (ii), one
might suppose that layoffs from jobs with longer pre-displacement tenure
are more likely to be remembered (and reported),33 in which case the
coefficient on the interaction of the layoff dummy and the high-tenure
dummy should suffer less from retrospection bias than does the analogous
coefficient on the layoff dummy reported in Table 3. As noted in the text
331n fact, there is some evidence along these lines. For our sample
as a whole: (1) the layoffs reported in 1984 by workers with less than
three years of pre-displacement job tenure are 164, 247, and 262 for 1981-
3, respectively, while the layoffs reported in 1986 by such workers are 78,
126, and 92 for the same years; (2) the layoffs reported in 1984 by workers
with at least three years of pre-displacement job tenure are 150, 257, and
222 for 1981-3, respectively, while the layoffs reported in 1986 by such
workers are 115, 135, and 113 for the same years.39
in connection with Table 4, however, our findings are only strengthened by
focusing on the (-year) high-tenure sub-sample, and the same is true for
this (three-year) high-tenure sub-sample: for white-collar workers with at
least three years of tenure on their pre-displacement jobs, for example,
the extra loss in post-displacement earnings following a layoff rather than
a plant closing is 11 percent, rather than the 6.4 percent for all white-
collar workers reported in Table 3 or the 8.2 percent for white-collar
workers with at least two years of pre-displacement tenure reported in
Table 4.40
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